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STATEMENT OF APPELLATE JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this case pursuant to Sections 78-2a3(2(h) of the Utah Code Annotated.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
The following issues require consideration by the Court as a result of the March
26, 2008 Supplemental Decree of Divorce by the Honorable Bruce C. Lubeck, trial court
judge. The ultimate legal question is whether Respondent should have visitation and
visitation rights with his step daughter.
The issues to be resolved in this appeal are:
1. Did the trial court err in finding that the Respondent had no standing in his
divorce proceedings to petition for visitation with his wife's child.
Standard of Review: The issue of whether the Respondent, as a step parent, has
standing to petition for visitation is a matter of law, and is therefore subject to de novo
review by the Court of Appeals using a correction of error standard.
Supporting Authority: State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994); Kessimakis v.
Kessimakis, 977 P.2d 1226 (Utah Ct. App. 1999).
2.

If the Court erred in finding that the Respondent Stepfather did not have

standing to petition for visitation with the minor child, then should the matter be
remanded to the trial court for additional findings regarding the best interests of the child
regarding visitation and child support?

1

Standard of Review: The issue of whether the Court should remand this case to
the trial court for additional findings regarding the Respondent's visitation and the best
interests of the child is dependent upon the Appeals Court's decision on whether the
Respondent had standing to petition for visitation with his step daughter.
Supporting Authority: Carlton v. Carlton, 756 P.2d 86 (Utah App. 1988).
3.

If the Court erred in finding that the Respondent Stepfather did not have

standing to petition for visitation with the minor child, then should the matter be
remanded to the trial court for additional findings regarding the Petitioner's contempt in
refusing to follow the temporary order granting the Respondent visitation with the minor
child?
Standard of Review: The issue of whether the Court should remand this case to
the trial court for additional findings regarding the Petitioner's contempt in refusing to
follow the temporary order is dependent upon the Appeals Court's decision on standing.
Supporting Authority: Carlton v. Carlton, 756 P. 2d 86 (Utah App. 1988).
PRESERVATION OF ISSUES ON APPEAL
The issue of the Respondent's standing to petition for visitation was preserved for
appeal in the trial court. In his Answer and Counterclaim, the Respondent asserted his
right to petition the court for visitation with his step daughter, Ruzele. (R. at 14 -18).
Additionally, the issue of the Respondent's visitation was certified for trial by the district
court commissioner as evidenced by the Pretrial Order signed on March 28, 2007 (R. at
380-382). The issue of the Petitioner's contempt was raised by the Respondent by motion,
2

and evidence regarding the Petitioner's contempt was presented at trial. The trial court
judge addressed the Petitioner's contempt in his final ruling, which constitute the findings
of fact and conclusions of law in this case (R. at 616).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES. OR RULES
UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5, attached in addendum.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a decision of the lower court, Honorable Bruce C. Lubeck,
finding that the Respondent, the step father of the minor child of the Petitioner, did not
have standing to petition the court for visitation with his step daughter. The lower court
based its findings on the decision of the Utah Supreme Court in Jones v. Barlow, 154
P.2d 808 (Utah 2007). The Jones v. Barlow decision was released after the Petition for
Divorce had been filed, but prior to trial. Based on its decision that the Respondent did
not have standing, the lower court declined to award the Respondent visitation with the
minor child, and declined to punish the Petitioner for her contemptuous behavior.
The Utah Legislature passed the Custody and Visitation for Persons Other Than
Parents Act in the 2008 Legislative session, in response to some uncertainties created by
the Jones v. Barlow decision. The Act is not retroactive and is not available as a remedy
to the Respondent.

3

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
The statement of facts is based upon the record of this case in the pleadings of the
parties, including memorandum and supporting addenda in the lower court.
1.

Petitioner/Appellee Tracy Strauss ("Strauss") and Respondent/Appellant

David Tuschman ("Tuschman") were married on July 20, 1996. (R. at 572).
2.

At the time of their marriage, Strauss had a child, Ruzele, born January 7,

1994, prior to the marriage, from a biological father Robert Hay den ("Hay den"). (R. at
572).
3.

Hay den and Strauss were never married. (R. at 572). Hay den did not know

of Ruzele's existence and was told that Strauss had a miscarriage. (R. at 589).
4.

After Strauss and Tuschman were married, Strauss and Ruzele moved to

Texas to be with Tuschman. (R. at 572).
5.

During the marriage the parties separated due to disagreements. (R. at 572).

6.

Strauss moved to Park City, Utah with Ruzele and resided with Strauss'

mother and sister. (R. at 572).
7.

For a time after the separation, Tuschman remained in Texas working at his

property management business. In July 2002 Tuschman and Strauss reconciled, moving
in together. (R. at 572).
8.

Tuschman and Strauss remained in contact during their periods of separation.

While Tuschman was living in Texas, he would visit Strauss and Ruzele monthly, and
Strauss and Ruzele traveled to Texas to visit Tuschman. Tuschman provided minimal
4

financial support to Strauss and Ruzele. (R. at 572-573). Tuschman also spoke with
Ruzele by telephone. (R. at 586).
9.

In July 2002 the parties and Ruzele moved into a Jeremy Ranch home and

remained together until July 2003 when Strauss and Ruzele moved out and rejoined her
mother and sister. (R. at 573). The parties reconciled again for a brief period in 2004.
(R. at 573).
10.

During the separations, Tuschman saw Ruzele and did things with her and

for her. While the parties lived together, Tuschman also did things with and for Ruzele,
including providing financial support. Tuschman participated with Ruzele in school and
other activities. (R. at 573). Tuschman had a valuable relationship with the child,
engaging in normal father-daughter activities. (R. at 586).
11.

Tuschman utilized his trust funds to purchase the Jeremy Ranch home where

he resided with Strauss and Ruzele. (R at 574).
12.

During the marriage, Tuschman provided financial support to Strauss and

Ruzele. From 2002 to 2004 the parties and the minor child lived completely off
Tuschman's separate trust funds. (R. at 576).
13.

Tuschman formed a strong bond of love and affection with Ruzele prior to

the final separation of the parties in May 2004, which occurred when Ruzele was 10 years
old. Tuschman supported Strauss and Ruzele in Utah through his trust funds. He sought
to adopt Ruzele, but was rebuffed by Strauss, who would not consent to the adoption. (R.
at 586).
5

14.

Initially, after she filed for divorce, Strauss did not seek to halt Tuschman's

visitation, and agreed in a hearing that he could have visitation. (R. at 586).
15.

On July 6, 2005, the Court entered a Stipulation and Temporary Order Re:

Motion for Temporary Restraining Order pursuant to Rule 65 A pursuant to agreements
reached by the parties at a hearing held on May 13, 2005. Strauss and Tuschman
stipulated that Tuschman would have visitation with Ruzele one afternoon per week, and
every other Friday overnight. (R. at 111).
16.

Despite her previous agreements, Strauss later objected to visitation in a

hearing held on June 30, 2005. Strauss claimed that Tuschman had no relationship with
Ruzele. On July 19, 2005, the Court entered a Temporary Order finding that a
relationship had been established between Tuschman and Ruzele, and that Tuschman was
entitled to visitation. The court then set forth a visitation schedule for Tuschman and
Ruzele and ordered that a visitation evaluation take place. (R. at 135 - 136).
17.

Visitation still remained a problem. Tuschman sought a contempt finding,

which was reserved for trial, and reunification counseling was ordered. (R. at 587).
18.

Ruzele now verbalizes that she does not want to see Tuschman, does not

want him part of her life, and that she wants to be involved with Robert Hay den, her
biological father, introduced to her for the first time in 2005. (R. at 589).
19.

Ruzele has been alienated from Tuschman by Strauss. Although the Court

found that, at worst, Tuschman may have yelled at Ruzele and Strauss, the Court did not
find that this behavior was reasonable or sufficient to cause the child to reject the only
6

father figure she had known. (R. at 587-588).
20.

After the separation of the parties' and the filing of the divorce proceedings,

but before Strauss took the position that Ruzele did not have a relationship with
Tuschman, he enjoyed visitation with Ruzele without incident. There were no significant
events in 2005 to the present that would justify Ruzele's changed attitude. (R. at 590).
21.

Ruzele now views Tuschman as all evil and wrong, and cannot recall any

fun or good times she had with him, despite clear evidence to the contrary in the form of
pictures, notes and testimony which the Court heard as part of the evidence. (R. at 588).
22.

During reunfication counseling, Ruzele indicated she did not want to be

there, did not want to talk to Tuschman, and could not recall any good memories even
when shown photographs of herself and Tuschman obviously enjoying good times in her
younger years. (R. at 588).
23.

Ruzele's attitude is attributable to Strauss' direct or covert negative attitudes

toward Tuschman. Strauss chose Father's Day to tell Ruzele that Tuschman was not her
real father and that she had a biological father named Robert Hayden. Although Ruzele
and Hayden did not meet for several years after Ruzele was told of Hayden's identity,
Strauss chose to take Ruzele to California to meet Hayden just at the time that visitation
became most difficult for Tuschman. (R. at 589).
24.

Ruzele states that her biological father Hayden is all good and she loves him,

while reporting that Tuschman is all bad and evil and she wants nothing to do with him.
There is no justification for these negative feelings other than Strauss' influence on the
7

child. (R. at 589).
25.

Hay den had no role in the child's life until May 2005 and could not have

had any role because Strauss told him she had miscarried. Hayden has had 5 physical
visits with Ruzele, but has provided no financial support. (R. at 589).
26.

The child's attitudes are based on feelings inculcated in Ruzele by Strauss

and her family. The bond between Strauss and Ruzele is particularly close and strong and
Strauss' views about Tuschman have, directly or covertly, been passed on to Ruzele. (R.
at 591).
27.

Strauss even testified that Tuschman tried to kill her when she accidentally

overdosed on prescription medication because he did not call emergency personnel
quickly enough after he discovered her in a largely comatose state. The Court did not
find this account to be factual in any event. It is unknown whether Strauss' attitudes
regarding this incident have been communicated to the child, but it may answer why the
child feels she wants nothing to do with Tuschman. (R. at 591).
28.

Strauss' feelings about Tuschman extend to an incident which occurred in

March 2007 where the child ended the reunification session abruptly upon entering the
session. The child left the room within moments of entering the room and within a
minute, the child was getting into a car with her mother outside the office of the therapist.
The pickup was clearly a planned event with Strauss waiting outside. (R. at 591-592).
29.

The child's therapist testified that the child did not want to see Tuschman

and that her wishes should be respected. The Trial Court found that many children do not
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want to do necessary, day to day activities, but need to be compelled. In this instance, the
Court found that it is in the child's best interests to realize that a relationship cannot be
broken and discarded and other's feelings and emotions trampled upon. (R. at 593).
30.

The Court also found that it would be in Ruzele's best interests that she be

permitted to decide if she wants Tuschman in her life without undue or unfair interference
from others. (R. at 593-594).
31.

The Court further found that it would be in Ruzele's best interests to work

through her conflicted feelings about Tuschman with the help of neutral persons. (R. at
594).
32.

The Court appointed visitation evaluator, Dr. Anna Trupp, recommended

that a guardian ad litem continue to be appointed for Ruzele's benefit, that Ruzele and
Tuschman have contact several times a year, that Tuschman be permitted to communicate
with Ruzele, and that Strauss and her family attend therapy. (Respondent's Trial Exhibit
T, included in Addendum).
33.

The Trial Court found that Dr. Anna Trupp was fair and unbiased in her

investigation. (R. at 594).
34.

Dr. Anna Trupp concluded that had it not been for Strauss' continued

interference and poisoning of Ruzele's attitudes about Tuschman, they would continue to
enjoy a health relationship. (Repondent's Trial Exhibit T, included in Addendum).
35.

The Trial Court found that it is in Ruzele's best interests for the Respondent

to have visitation with Ruzele. (R. at 606).
9

36.

The Trial Court found that Tuschman, as a step parent, did not have standing

to petition for visitation with his step daughter. (R. at 596).
37.

The Trial Court found that although Strauss is the cause of the failure of

visitation, there would be no purpose in punishing Strauss, and declined to find Strauss in
contempt for failure to provide visitation according to the temporary orders. (R. at 616).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The lower court erred in finding that the Respondent stepfather, David Tuschman
did not have standing to under the statutes or common law to petition the court for
visitation with the minor child Ruzele, because the Petitioner, the minor child's biological
mother, had terminated the in loco parentis relationship between Tuschman and Ruzele.
The lower court's decision should be reversed and the case remanded for further findings
regarding visitation and the Petitioner's contempt.
ARGUMENT
1.

The Trial Court Erred in Applying the Holdings in Jones v. Barlow to this
Case and Finding that the Respondent Had No Legal Right to Seek or Obtain
Visitation Because He is a Stepparent.
The lower court concluded "...as a legal determination the court rules it cannot and

does not examine the best interest of the child as respondent has no legal right to seek or
obtain visitation with a step child that has not been adopted." This holding is in direct
conflict with the holdings of the Utah Supreme Court in Jones v. Barlow, 154 P.3d 808
(Utah 2007) and Gribble v. Gribble, 583 P.2d 64 (Utah 1978).
The starting point for the lower court's analysis was whether Tuschman, having
10

married Strauss, had standing to petition for visitation with the minor child as a parent or
"other member of the immediate family" under Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(5). The lower
court stated "[Ojnly if respondent has such standing would the court consider what is in
the child's best interests." R. At p. 29.
The lower court then proceeded to rule that the Jones court modified Gribble when
it determined that the in loco parentis relationship was temporary and terminable at will
by the surrogate parent, the child, or the biological parent. Therefore, the lower court
concluded that Tuschman did not stand in loco parentis to the child because Strauss
terminated that relationship. Thus, Tuschman could not be considered a "parent" to
petition for visitation under Utah Code § 30-3-5(5). This is where the lower court's
analysis conflicts from the holdings in Jones and Gribble.
The lower court then went on to determine whether Tuschman could be considered
an "immediate family member" under Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(5). The lower court
analysed decisions in which Utah and other state courts have addressed the idea of
"immediate family members," and concluded that in the context of visitation and custody,
the term "immediate family member" should be defined in relationship to the child and
not to the parent. Based on the foregoing, the lower court determined that "a third party
must have some direct legal or biological relationship to the child, and not just to the
parent of that child." Because Tuschman was not related to the child legally or
biologically, he had no standing to petition for visitation.
The lower court's conclusion that a step parent has no standing to petition for
11

visitation in a divorce proceeding directly conflicts with the holdings in Gribble v.
Gribble and Jones v. Barlow. Although the Jones court modified its holdings in Gribble
as to the termination of the in loco parentis relationship, the Jones court clarified its
holdings in Gribble as they relate to a step parent's standing to petition for visitation.
The Utah Supreme Court distinguished Jones' status as a domestic partner of
Barlow from that of Gribble as stepfather and husband. In Jones v. Barlow the Court
stated "Although this court recognized the right of stepparents to seek visitation in
Gribble v. Gribble, 583 P.2d 64 (Utah 1978), standing in that case arose out of an
interpretation of statutory law granting such rights, not from an independent common law
source. We decline to extend the common law doctrine of in loco parentis to create
standing where it does not arise out of statute."
In Gribble, Appellant stepfather petitioned the divorce court for reasonable
visitation with his wife's son. The stepfather had treated the child as his own, felt very
close to him, and was concerned about the child's future welfare. He offered to provide
support for the child's benefit. Appellant had lived with the child from the time he was
two months old until the parties separation, four years later. The child had no contact
with his biological father.
The lower court in Gribble held that the stepfather was not entitled to a hearing on
visitation. The Utah Supreme Court held otherwise, finding that a step parent who stood
"in loco parentis" to a child should be considered a "parent" for purposes of Utah Code
Ann. § 30-3-5, thereby conferring jurisdiction on the lower court to determine whether it
12

is in the child's best interest to grant the step father a right of visitation.
The Jones Court was compelled to engage in a different analysis from the Gribble
Court because Jones and Barlow were never married, and the Petitioner, Kerri Lynn
Jones, was not a biological or adoptive parent to the child. Jones and Barlow held the
status of "domestic partners," which is not a statutorily defined relationship in the State of
Utah. Furthermore, Jones brought suit in district court seeking a "decree of custody and
visitation," claiming standing under the in loco parentis doctrine, and not by virtue of any
State statute. The Jones Court declined to confer standing on Jones by virtue of the
common law in loco parentis doctrine, independent of any statutory provision.
In this case, the trial court applied the Jones holdings to the facts before it, stating
that once Strauss had terminated the in loco parentis relationship, Tuschman lost any
standing to petition for visitation with Ruzele. However, this application of the Jones
holding is contrary to statements made by the Utah Supreme Court in Jones.
The Jones Court argued that Gribble based a stepparent's standing to seek
visitation upon an interpretation of a Utah Divorce statute, Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(5)(a)
which states that "visitation rights of parents, grandparents and other relatives shall take
into consideration the welfare of the child." The Jones court then went on to say "We
read this phrase to ' indicate [ ] the legislative intent to protect the relationships which
affect the child whose parents are being divorced' and reasoned that an individual who
6

stand[s] in the relationship of parent, grandparent or other relative' had standing under

the statute to seek visitation." Jones, 154 P.3d at 814, citing Gribble, 583 P.2d at 66.
13

The Jones court stated that in Gribble it "used the in loco parentis doctrine as an
'interpretive tool' to guide the inquiry as to who stands in one of those relationships" Id.
At 814. The court then found the analysis in Gribble to be inapplicable to the facts in
Jones because Jones relied solely upon the common law for her standing. The Jones court
added further distinction between Jones' status as domestic partner and that of Gribble as
step father by saying "[F]inally, Jones is not proceeding under the divorce statutes as did
the stepparent in Gribble." Id, at 815.
The trial court in this case departed from the Supreme Court's clear distinctions
and simply found that Tuschman could not stand in loco parentis to the child because
Strauss had terminated the in loco parentis relationship. Further, Tuschman, under the
trial court's narrow analysis, was not an immediate family member, and therefore had no
standing to petition for visitation with his step daughter.
This departure leads to an inequitable and damaging result. The trial court made
its discomfort clear and stated "the court believes respondent SHOULD have visitation
with this child. Had the court been required to analyze the facts with the best interest of
the child in mind, as noted, the basic recommendations of the evaluator would largely
have been adopted." (R. At page 38).
A more reasoned and consistent approach in interpreting the statutory language is
to follow the guidance of the Utah Supreme Court in Gribble v. Gribble. In Gribble the
Court stated that the 1975 amendment to Sec. 30-3-5 adding the phrase, "Visitation rights
of parents, grandparents and other relatives shall take into consideration the welfare of the
14

child," was reflective of the Legislature's codification of "traditional common law rules
permitting an equitable investigation into whether it is in the welfare of the child that
parents, grandparents, or other relatives be accorded visitation rights." Gribble, 583 P.2d
64, at 66 (Utah 1978).
Like the step father in Gribble, the lower court found that Tuschman had treated
Ruzele as his own, felt very close to her, had provided financial and emotional support to
her, and had done typical father-daughter activities. Like the step father in Gribble, this
Court should find that Tuschman has standing under the Utah divorce statute to petition
the Court for visitation with Ruzele.
2.

Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(5)(a) Confers Jurisdiction on the District
Courts to Entertain a Stepparent's Petition for Visitation.

Utah statutes confer jurisdiction on the district courts of the State to enter a decree
of dissolution of the marriage contract between a petitioner and a respondent. The
divorce statutes also confer jurisdiction on the courts to enter orders regarding disposition
of property and debts, custody and visitation of children, alimony, and other matters
incident to the marriage contract of the parties to a divorce. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-1, et.
seq.
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(1) states that "When a decree of divorce is rendered, the
court may include in it equitable orders relating to the children, property, debts or
obligations, and parties." The statute confers broad discretion on courts to use their
equitable powers in entering orders regarding children incident to divorce proceedings.

15

Further, Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(5)(a) states that "In determining parent-time
rights of parents and visitation rights of grandparents and other members of the immediate
family, the court shall consider the best interests of the child." The legislature modified
the language of the statute in 1993, removing the phrase "relatives" and adding in its
place "other immediate family members." In the same bill, the legislature also conferred
visitation rights on grandparents in a separate statutory section. See 1993 Utah Laws 152.
Although the Jones v. Barlow court stated in a footnote that "We make no
determination whether the Gribble interpretation of the prior version of Utah Code
Section 30-3-5 applies to the slightly modified wording contained in the current version
of the code[.]" the change cannot be construed to be a deprivation of the step parent
standing conferred by Gribble because Gribble's holding determined that the stepparent
was a "parent" under the statute in part because of his in loco parentis status. Also, had
the Legislature intended that result, it would not have let the statute stand as written for
over 20 years.
The plain language of the statute, and the interpretation of that language by the
Utah Court in Gribble and Jones v. Barlow supports a ruling that the statute confers
standing on Tuschman to petition for visitation with his step daughter, Ruzele.
3.

The Lower Court Erred in Finding that the Respondent Lacked
Standing Because the In Loco Parentis Relationship Had Not Been
Terminated Prior to the Filing of the Divorce.

The lower court determined that Tuschman could not achieve standing to petition
for visitation with his step daughter as a "parent" under Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(5)(a)
16

because by the time of trial, Strauss had terminated the in loco parentis relationship.
However, Strauss did not attempt to terminate the relationship until more than a year after
filing for divorce. At the time of filing of the divorce, Tuschman had an intact in loco
parentis relationship with the minor child, Ruzele. Furthermore, this relationship was
preserved by a finding in the Court's temporary order entered on July 19, 2005, stating
that "a relationship has been established between minor child, Ruzele Strauss, and her
stepfather, Respondent, David Tuschman." As part of the temporary order, the Court
found that Tuschman was entitled to visitation, and implemented a visitation schedule. (R
at 135-136).
If this Court were to adopt the lower court's interpretation that jurisdiction once
conferred by statute due to the existence of an in loco parentis relationship can be
terminated at any time by termination of the underlying in loco parentis relationship, the
results could be disastrous. The question must then be asked - would existing Decrees of
Divorce or temporary orders containing visitation rights for step parents be immediately
voidable by biological parents? Clearly Strauss thought so when she chose to violate the
existing temporary orders in the case, with negative effects for both Tuschman and the
minor child.
At trial, the Court found that Tuschman "was involved with and had a valuable
relationship with the child, engaging in what the court will call normal father-daughter
activities." (R at paragraph 16, page 18). The Court further identified that as time passed
after the filing of the divorce, "visitation became increasingly rare and difficult to attain
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for respondent because of petitioner's conduct." (R. at 586-587). It was further
determined that Tuschman supported Strauss and Ruzele financially, and expected to pay
child support for Ruzele. Clearly, Tuschman had an in loco parentis relationship with
Ruzele prior to and after the filing of the divorce case.
Strauss did not object to Tuschman's visitation until June 2005, more than one
year after the divorce petition was filed. By that time, Strauss had interfered with
Tuschman's relationship with Ruzele, and made visitation visits very difficult. She had
also introduced Ruzele to her biological father in an attempt to alienate Ruzele from
Tuschman. (Rat 589).
In both Jones v. Barlow and Gribble, the Utah Supreme Court utilized the in loco
parentis doctrine to describe the type of relationship contemplated by the Utah Legislature
in its codification of the rights of third parties to petition for visitation with a child. These
third party rights were limited by the Legislature to actions brought pursuant to the
divorce statute found at Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-1, et seq. The standing contemplated by
both the Jones and the Barlow courts were for those proceedings brought under the
divorce statute.
Similarly, this Court can determine that because the action was brought pursuant to
the divorce statute, Tuschman had standing originally as a "parent" under the in loco
parentis doctrine, which permits and in fact compels the lower court to engage in an
analysis of the best interests of the child.

18

4.

The Legislature Confirmed Its Original Intentions by Passing
Legislation Conferring Standing on Stepparents to Petition for
Visitation with Their Stepchildren.

In the 2008 legislative session, the Utah Legislature addressed the confusion
caused by the Jones v. Barlow and Gribble decisions by passing the Custody and
Visitation for Persons other than Parents Act, Utah Code Ann. § 30-5a-l, et. seq. (The
"Act"). The Act permits a "person other than a parent" to file a petition with the juvenile
or district courts, to establish custody or visitation with a child with whom they have
intentionally assumed the role of a parent to the child. A current or former stepparent is
listed as a "person other than a parent" with standing to petition under the Act.
Unfortunately, the statute was not retroactive, and its effective date of May 5, 2008 did
not permit the Respondent to utilize the provisions of the Act. Further, because of the
decision rendered in this case, unless the lower court's holding is reversed by this Court,
the Respondent is barred from seeking remedy under the Act.
5.

The Lower Court Found it in the Best Interests of the Child, Ruzele, to
Have a Relationship with her Stepfather, David Tuschman, and This
Court Should Remand the Case for Further Findings Regarding that
Relationship.

In its findings, the lower court engaged in a lengthy description of Tuschman's
relationship with Ruzele, and the deterioration of that relationship due to Strauss'
alienation. The lower court also considered the recommendations of the visitation
evaluator, Dr. Anna Trupp, finding her to be fair and unbiased in her investigation. (R. at
594). The lower court stated that "[H]ad the court been required the analyze the facts
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with the best interest of the child in mind, as noted, the basic recommendations of the
evaluator would largely have been adopted." (R. at 606).
Dr. Anna Trupp recommended the court continue the appointment of a guardian ad
litem, and that the guardian inform Ruzele of Tuschman's contact information and
provide Ruzele with letters from Tuschman. Further, Dr. Trupp recommended that
Strauss and her family work with a therapist to understand the effects of broken
attachments on the child. Finally, Dr. Trupp recommended that Tuschman and Ruzele
have four visits per year, in the presence of a therapist or the guardian. This, Dr. Trupp
felt, would permit Ruzele to "enmesh or individuate from her maternal family without
feeling pressured from both sides, and then be provided the opportunity to assess her
feelings at a later time." (Respondent's Trial Exhibit T, included in Addendum).
It is clear from both the Court's findings and Dr. Trupp's report that denying a
relationship between Ruzele and Tuschman is not in Ruzele's best interests, and could be
harmful to her future development. If this Court finds that Tuschman has standing to
petition for visitation with Ruzele, the Court should remand the case for adequate and
complete findings of fact and conclusions of law as to the visitation to be ordered in the
case.
6.

This Court Should Remand the Case for Further Findings Regarding
the Contempt of Petitioner Because the Lower Court Found that
although Petitioner Failed to Follow the Temporary Orders, Punishing
the Petitioner for Contempt Would Have No Meaning Because of the
Respondent's Lack of Standing to Petition for Visitation.
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Tuschman sought a contempt finding from the lower court that Strauss had failed
to comply with the temporary orders regarding visitation. The issue of contempt was
reserved for trial. At trial, the lower court determined that Strauss had alienated Ruzele
from her stepfather, and that Strauss was the cause of Ruzele's attitudes towards
Tuschman, and the cause of the failure of visitation. (R. at 616).
Despite the lower courts findings, it determined that "there would be no purpose in
'punishing' petitioner at this point. Any theory of punishment, retribution or specific
deterrence, has no meaning in this context as this will not be repeated." (R. at 616).
If this Court finds that Tuschman has standing to petition for visitation then
remanding the case for further findings regarding contempt, and sanctions, would be
meaningful and appropriate because it would discourage Strauss from disobeying future
court orders.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, this Court should reverse the lower court's ruling and
remand the case for further findings regarding visitation and contempt.
DATED this*? P day of November, 2008.
BOOTH LAW OFFICE, P.C.

Maria L. Booth
Attorney for Appellant/Respondent
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